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Sosunova and Tucker: The Eleventh Amendment: "A Work In Progress"

NOTE
THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT: "A WORK IN
PROGRESS"
Imagine you have been working for the same company for almost
forty years. You dedicated your life to this company. You are sixty years
old. You do not plan on retiring for at least another five or six years.
Then, one day, your boss comes in and tells you, "We are no longer in
need of your services, it is a good time for you to retire, or we can fire
you." What choice do you have? You choose early retirement.
A few weeks later you are talking with your former coworkers. You
are told that your boss hired someone younger to replace you. You just
discovered you are a victim of age discrimination. To make matters
worse, you work for the state and learn that the federal Age
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA)' does not protect you.2
Now, imagine that you are wheelchair-bound. You apply for a job
at a state agency. The office building is not wheelchair-accessible.
Although you meet the necessary job requirements, you are denied
employment. The job is given to a less qualified individual who is not
dependent on a wheelchair because the state refuses to renovate the
office building. You decide to take action and file a complaint against
your employer, the State, for violations of the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA).3 You file your action in state court seeking relief
under this Act. The State removes the action to federal court based on
federal question jurisdiction. Now, your case is in federal court and you
think, "Perfect! I will be able to enforce my federal rights in federal
court." Both parties proceed with discovery, depositions, summary

1. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (2001).
2. See, e.g., Arkansas v. Goss, 42 S.W.3d 440 (Ark. 2001). The plaintiff alleged that he was
denied employment on the basis of his age; the job was given to a younger person. Id. at 441. He
initiated his claim in state court and subsequently his claim was removed by the State to federal
court. Id. The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit dismissed the action on Eleventh Amendment
immunity grounds and remanded the case to state court. Id.
3. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2001).
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judgment motions, and pretrial conferences all in preparation for trial.
But wait-you are in for a surprise!
You arrive at the courthouse on the day of trial expecting to give
your opening statement, but the State says, "Not just yet. We have one
more motion." The State confronts you with a motion to dismiss for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction. You are shocked. Afterall, it was the State
that voluntarily removed the action and now it claims Eleventh
Amendment immunity from the suit in federal court. How is this
possible?
Imagine an even worse scenario. You proceed with the trial in
federal court after voluntary removal by the State. A verdict is rendered
in your favor and the State's response is, "It is too early to start your
celebration. We have a surprise waiting for you!" The State has a new
theory on appeal: it claims that as a sovereign entity, it is immune from
the suit in federal court. Moreover, the State claims that its sovereign
immunity operates as a jurisdictional bar similar to subject matter
jurisdiction, which can be raised at anytime. The State wins the appeal
and your claim is dismissed.
Usually, when an action has been removed to federal court and
subsequently dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, the federal court
remands the action to the state court from which it was removed.
However, this is not always the case. You are fortunate though; your
case is one of the few that is successfully remanded. But you learn that
even if you win the action in state court, you cannot receive the
monetary relief guaranteed to employees under federal employment
laws. Why? Because the court feels that requiring a state to pay
monetary damages for its federal employment law violations would
place an "unfair burden" on the state treasury. You think, "What about
me? I have the burden of litigating the same claim twice."
Why should state employees be denied their rights under these
employment protection statutes? Had you worked or applied to a federal,
private, or local employer, that employer may be required to
accommodate you or be held accountable under federal employment
laws. However, because you applied for a job with a state agency, you
are not guaranteed the full protection of these laws.
This Note discusses problems and suggests solutions related to the
unfair treatment of state employees in court as they attempt to enforce
their federal employment rights. Under these proposed solutions, state
employees will be guaranteed treatment equal to that of federal, private,
or local employees.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol19/iss1/4

2

Sosunova and Tucker: The Eleventh Amendment: "A Work In Progress"
2001]

"A Work In Progress"

I. INTRODUCTION
Recent Supreme Court decisions' restrict the rights available to
state employees under federal employment laws.' First, state employees
may not be able to assert these rights in federal court. Second, when
state employees bring suit in state court, the remedies available to them
are limited. No such limitations affect the rights of federal, private, or
local employees.
A state employee who files suit in state court against her employer,
claiming violations of the ADA,6 the ADEA,7 or the Fair Labor
Standards Act (FLSA) 8 expects to have the claim adjudicated in state
court, where the action was properly filed. After receiving the claim, the
defendant, the State, may choose to remove the action to federal district

4. See generally Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001) (holding that
Title I of the ADA is not a valid abrogation of Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity); Kimel v.
Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000) (holding that the ADEA does not validly abrogate
sovereign immunity); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999) (holding that the Fair Labor Standards
Act is not a valid abrogation of a state's sovereign immunity).
5. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (2001); 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634; 42 U.S.C. §§ 1210112213.
6. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213. The purpose of the Act is:
(1) to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of
discrimination against individuals with disabilities;
(2) to provide clear, strong, consistent, enforceable standards addressing discrimination
against individuals with disabilities;
(3) to ensure that the Federal Government plays a central role in enforcing the standards
established in this chapter on behalf of individuals with disabilities; and
(4) to invoke the sweep of congressional authority, including the power to enforce the
fourteenth amendment and to regulate commerce, in order to address the major areas of
discrimination faced day-to-day by people With disabilities.
Id. at § 12101(b).
7. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634. The purpose of the Act is "to promote employment of older
persons based on their ability rather than age; to prohibit arbitrary age discrimination in
employment; to help employers and workers find ways of meeting problems arising from the impact
of age on employment." Id. § 621(b). The legislative history of the ADEA confirms that "Congress'
purpose in extending coverage to state and local governments was :toprohibit discriminatory
conduct and insure equal treatment to older citizens." 29 U.S.C.S. § 621 notes (Purpose) (LEXIS
2001).
8. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219. According to Congress, the purpose of the Act is
to exclude from interstate commerce goods produced for commerce and to prevent their
production for interstate commerce under conditions detrimental to maintenance of
minimum standards of living necessary for health and general well-being and to prevent
use of interstate commerce as means of competition in distribution of goods so produced
and as means of spreading and perpetuating such substandard labor conditions among
workers of several states.
29 U.S.C.S. § 202 notes (Purpose, generally) (LEXIS 2001).
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court under the federal removal statute.9 The removal statute provides
that
any civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of
the United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the
defendant or the defendants, to the district court of the United States
for the district and division embracing the place where such action is
pending.'°
Once the case is removed to federal district court, the State has two
options: (1) go to trial on the merits, or (2) claim immunity under the
Eleventh Amendment." If the State proceeds to trial on the merits and
wins, the judgment is final. However, if the state loses at trial, it may
retain the ability to assert its Eleventh Amendment immunity on appeal,
which may result in dismissal of the action. In this instance, courts do
not consider the actual merits of the claim, but will dismiss the case on
procedural grounds. However, if the employee receives an adverse
judgment at trial, the judgment stands.' 2
Currently, the employee does not enjoy the same procedural
advantages as the state-another chance at victory. In Dunn v. Baltimore
County Board of Education,3 the plaintiff filed suit in state court against
his employer, the State, alleging discrimination under state law and the
ADEA.14 In response, the State, using the ADEA claims as the basis for
removal, removed the action to federal court. 5 Once in federal court, the
State claimed Eleventh Amendment immunity based on the Supreme
Court's decision in Kimel v. FloridaBoard of Regents, 6 and moved for
dismissal of the federal and state law claims." Subsequently, the district

9. 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (2001).

10. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). A claim filed under the federal employment statutes can be removed
to federal district court under federal question jurisdiction. "The district courts shall have original
jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States."
28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2001).
11. See U.S. CONST. amend. XI. "The Judicial power of the United States shall not be
construed to extend to any suit in law -or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United
States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." Id.
12. When a decision has been made on the merits, res judicata prevents relitigation of the
same claim or issue. 18 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4402 (1981). Specifically, the doctrine of claim preclusion
applies.
13. 83 F. Supp. 2d 611 (D. Md. 2000).
14. Id.
at 612.
15. id.

16. 528 U.S. 62 (2000).
17.

Dunn, 83 F. Supp. 2d at 612.
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court dismissed the ADEA claims, holding that the State enjoys
sovereign immunity from suit in federal court, and remanded the
remaining state law claims to state court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1447(c).' s The court held:
[T]his Court's original and removal jurisdiction both stemmed from a
claim barred by the Eleventh Amendment. There is persuasive
authority that a claim barred by the Eleventh Amendment is one over
which the federal court has no jurisdiction, and that state-law based
claims supplemental thereto must be remanded, rather than dismissed,
after' 9an Eleventh Amendment dismissal of the only "federal" claim in
suit.

By removing the action to federal court, the State obtained dismissal of
an otherwise legitimate federal claim, which would not have been
accomplished by maintaining the action in state court.
As a result of the Supreme Court's decisions in Alden v. Maine, °
Kimel, and Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett,2' a
state now has the opportunity to remove claims to federal court to gain a
procedural advantage over its employees. States can use the sovereign
immunity defense as a tool to quash discrimination claims by
employees.
In addition, the restrictions the courts placed on Congress have
limited Congress's ability to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment, and
have directly impacted a litigant's ability to recover damages for
violations of federal laws." Although a litigant may sue the state for
injunctive relief in federal court, she must then bring a separate lawsuit
in state court to recover monetary damages. 23 This prolonged process
only increases the cost and time of litigation.24 This is not the only
obstacle that a litigant in this situation may encounter. Other issues may
come into consideration, such as claim preclusion and the statute of
limitations, which may bar relitigation in state court.

18. Id. A federal district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim
if the court has dismissed all claims over which it had original jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3)

(2001).
19. Dunn, 83 F. Supp. 2d at 612.
20. 527 U.S. 706 (1999).
21. 531 U.S. 356 (2001).
22. Daan Braveman, Enforcement of Federal Rights Against States: Alden and Federalism
Non-Sense, 49 AM. U. L. REV. 611,633 (2000).
23. Id.
24. Id.
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II. STATE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY

"The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to
extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against
one of the United States by Citizens of another State, o'r
by Citizens or
Subjects of any Foreign State. ,,25
A. The Eleventh Amendment

The Eleventh Amendment provides that a state is immune from suit
in federal court.26 Pursuant to a strict textual interpretation of the
Eleventh Amendment, it applies to suits against a State by citizens of
another state. Furthermore, in Hans v. Louisiana," the Supreme Court
expanded a state's sovereignty to include immunity from suits initiated
by its own citizens.28 Currently; the Eleventh Amendment is interpreted
as preventing non-consenting states from being subject to suit in federal
court by any party except the federal government or a federal agency.2 9
Courts have held that sovereign immunity is an implicit limitation on the
judicial power of federal courts.30
The protections afforded by Eleventh Amendment immunity are
also extended to state officials and state agencies.' The Supreme Court
25. U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
26. Ramirez v. P.R. Fire Serv., 715 F.2d 694, 697 (1st Cir. 1983). "The Eleventh Amendment
stands as a palladium of sovereign immunity. It bars federal court lawsuits by private parties...
unless the state has consented to suit or unless the protective cloak of the amendment has been
doffed by waiver or stripped away by congressional fiat." Id.
27. 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
28. Id. at 11;see also Leon Friedman, Supreme Court Federalism Decisions, 16 TOURO L.
REV. 243 (2000). Friedman points out that "[t]he Eleventh Amendment says two things, both of
which the Supreme Court has totally disregarded since the beginning. It says the judicial power of
the United States shall not extend to a suit between a state and a citizen of another state." Id. at 251.
The Eleventh Amendment implies that the judicial power of the United States should not be
extended to a suit brought by a citizen against his or her state in a state court. Id. at 251-52.
"Therefore, on two grounds the Eleventh Amendment should not be a problem." Id. at 251.
29. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 755-56 (1999).
30. Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 72-73 (2000); see also Reese v. Michigan, No.
99-1173, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 27404, at *11 (6th Cir. Oct. 24, 2000) (holding that "[a]lthough
the Amendment on its face prohibits only suits brought against a state by 'Citizens of another State,'
the Supreme Court has long construed the Amendment to protect states from suits filed by their own
citizens in federal court on the basis of federal question jurisdiction").
31. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663 (1974) (holding that the Eleventh Amendment may
still apply if a state is not a named party); see also Sutton v. Utah State Sch. for the Deaf & Blind,
173 F.3d 1226, 1232 (10th Cir. 1999) (stating that "[o]nly a state or 'arms' of a state may assert the
Eleventh Amendment as a defense to suit in federal court").
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held that "[t]he Eleventh Amendment bars suits not only against the state
itself, but also against a subdivision of the state if the state remains 'the
real party in interest.' 3 2 A state agency is deemed to be the real party in
interest when "the judgment sought would expend itself on the public
treasury or domain, or interfere with the public administration, or if the
effect of the judgment would be to restrain the Government from acting,
or to compel it to act."33 In these actions, because the state is responsible
for damages, the action is considered a suit against the state. However, a
claim seeking injunctive or declaratory relief can be maintained against a
state official or agency, 34 since these types of actions are not brought
against the state itself.35
B. Waiver of Eleventh Amendment Immunity
The Supreme Court has been using the Eleventh Amendment to
justify restricting an individual's ability to sue a state in federal court for
federal rights violations and to obtain federal remedies. However, there

32. Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Post-Secondary Educ. Expense Bd., 948 F. Supp. 400, 409
(D.N.J. 1996) (quoting Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663 (1974)); see also Sutton, 173 F.3d at
1232 (holding that there are four factors used to determine whether a particular political subdivision
is an arm of the state: "(1) the characterization of the governmental unit under state law; (2) the
guidance and control exercised by the state over the governmental unit; (3) the degree of state
funding received; and (4) the governmental unit's ability to issue bonds and levy taxes on its own
behalf').
33. Coll. Sav. Bank, 948 F. Supp. at 409 (quotation marks omitted) (quoting Pennhurst State
Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 101 n.11 (1984)).
34. Balgowan v. New Jersey, 115 F.3d 214, 217 (3rd Cir. 1997); see also Gordon L. Hamrick
IV, Comment, Roving Federalism: Waiver Doctrine After College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid
Postsecondary Education Expense Board, 49 EMORY L.J. 859, 865-66 (2000). The author notes that
under the Ex parte Young fiction, a private party still can obtain prospective injunctive
relief in an action brought against a state official, the Eleventh Amendment
notwithstanding. An action for money damages against a state officer in his or her
individual capacity for constitutional or statutory violations under Section 1983 also is
allowed if relief is sought from the officer personally, not the state treasury. Private
actions against lesser governmental entities such as counties are exempt from immunity
as well. Finally, a state may waive its Eleventh Amendment protection and consent to
suit in federal court.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
35. Watkins v. Cal. Dep't of Corr., 100 F. Supp. 2d 1227, 1232 (C.D. Cal. 2000); see also
Mitchell v. Franchise Tax Bd. (In re Mitchell), 209 F.3d 1111, 1120 (9th Cir. 2000) (noting that
"the basic rationale... is to allow parties to enforce their federal rights in state or federal court by
suing government officials for prospective relief, because the state itself cannot be sued without its
consent").
36. Braveman, supra note 22, at 612. "During the past two decades, the Supreme Court has
articulated federalism concerns to restrict a person's ability to sue a state in federal court for federal
rights violations." Id. According to the author:
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are avenues through which an employee may avoid the restrictions the
Eleventh Amendment places on the jurisdiction of the federal court.37
First, the Eleventh Amendment restriction does not apply when the
state waives its sovereign immunity and consents to the suit in federal
court." According to the Supreme Court, sovereign immunity is a
privilege that belongs to a state, and therefore a state has the power to
voluntarily waive its immunity and consent to suit in federal court.3 9
"The Supreme Court has held that states may consent to suit; sovereign
immunity is not an absolute bar to suit, but an immunity from suit
without consent."40 The federal courts established a "stringent" test to
determine whether the state waived its immunity .4 ' A state waives its
immunity if:

In an attempt to strike a balance between state and federal power, the Court sided with
the states. Relying in some instances on general federalism concerns and in others on the
Eleventh Amendment, the Court effectively closed the federal courthouse doors to many
lawsuits alleging state violations of the Constitution or federal statutes.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
37. ld. at 631.
38. Id.
39. Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 670
(1999) (finding that a state waives its immunity when it consents tosuit in federal court);
see also
Welch v. Tex. Dep't of Highways & Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 473 (1987) (noting that "[i]f a
State waives its immunity and consents to suit in federal court, the suit is not barred by the Eleventh
Amendment"); Clark v. Barnard, 108 U.S. 436, 447 (1883) (explaining that "[t]he immunity from
suit belong[s] to a State... [and] is a personal privilege which it may waive at pleasure"); Beers v.
Arkansas, 61 U.S. 527, 529 (1857) (finding that a state "may, if it thinks proper, waive this
privilege, and permit itself to be made a defendant"); Sutton v. Utah State Sch. for the Deaf &
Blind, 173 F.3d 1226, 1234 (10th Cir. 1999) (holding that "[w]hether immunity is a constitutional or
common law bar, the Court has held that the bar may be waived by consent to suit").
40. Jonathan R. Siegel, Congress's Power to Authorize Suits Against States, 68 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 44, 50 (1999); see also Watkins, 100 F. Supp. 2d at 1230. There are two instances in which
a state can waive its sovereign immunity:
First, the state may make a clear and unequivocal declaration that it intends to submit to
the jurisdiction of a federal court ....Second, the state may "voluntarily invoke the
jurisdiction" of the federal court ...by defending an action in federal court and
"voluntarily submitting its rights to judicial determination" by the federal tribunal.
Watkins, 100 F. Supp. 2d at 1230.
41. See Braveman, supra note 22, at 631. The author notes that
[a] general consent to sue and to be sued is insufficient to constitute a waiver. Moreover,
a state's consent to suit in its own courts, or in any court of competent jurisdiction, is not
deemed to be a waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity in federal court. Finally, a
waiver will not be implied from a state's voluntary participation in federally regulated
conduct. Such an implied waiver will not be found even when the state engages in
commercial ventures unassociated with the customary sovereign activities.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
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(1) the state expressly consents to federal jurisdiction in the context of
the litigation; (2) a state statute or constitutional provision expressly
provides for suit in a federal court; or (3) Congress clearly intends to
condition the state's participation in a program or activity on the
State's waiver of its immunity.42

Second, Congress may subject a state to suit in federal court by
abrogating its Eleventh Amendment immunity. 3 However, the Supreme
Court narrowly construes the power of Congress to do so." Congress
must be unmistakably clear in its intent to abrogate. 4' Even if Congress's
intent is clear, it may not be enough. 46
Congress no longer has the ability to abrogate the Eleventh
Amendment using the constructive waiver doctrine.47 Under this
doctrine, Congress had the ability to condition state participation in

federally regulated commercial fields on a state's waiver of its sovereign
immunity. 41 In striking down the constructive waiver doctrine, the
Supreme Court reasoned that "[t]he constitutional role of the States sets
them apart from other employers and defendants., 49 The Court reiterated
that constructive waiver is inconsistent with the premise of voluntary
and unequivocal waiver.'s
The practical effect of the Supreme Court's ruling in College
Savings Bank, and its subsequent holding in Seminole Tribe of Floridav.

42. Charley's Taxi Radio Dispatch Corp. v. SIDA of Haw., Inc., 810 F.2d 869, 873 (9th Cir.
1987) (citations omitted); see also Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 99
(1984) (ruling that the consent to suit must be "unequivocally expressed"); Smith v. Reeves, 178
U.S. 436, 445 (1900) (holding that if a state consents to suit in its own court, it has not consented to
suit in federal court).
43. Braveman, supra note 22, at 632.
44. Id.
45. Id. "A general authorization for suit in federal court is not the kind of unequivocal
statutory language sufficient to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment. When Congress chooses to
subject the States to federal jurisdiction, it must do so specifically." Atascadero State Hosp. v.
Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 246 (1985).
46. "The Court has found a way to protect the states from federal court jurisdiction, even
when congressional intent to lift the Eleventh Amendment immunity has been unmistakably clear."
Braveman, supra note 22, at 632.
47. Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 680
(1999).
48. Hamrick, supra note 34, at 859-60 (noting that "if Congress deemed it necessary to
establish private enforcement proceedings under a particular federal law, states and commercial
entities competing in the marketplace would be treated symmetrically under that enforcement
regime").
49. Coll. Say. Bank, 527 U.S. at 685-86 (quoting Welch v. Tex. Dep't of Highways & Pub.
Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 477 (1987)).
50. Id.at 680.
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5
Florida,
limits Congress's spending power over the states. Presently,

Congress can only abrogate a state's Eleventh Amendment immunity
using its powers under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.52

Additionally, under Seminole, Congress's intent to abrogate must be
"'unequivocally expresse[d]', 3 and Congress's actions must be
"'pursuant to a valid exercise of power." 54
55
In City of Boerne v. Flores,
the Supreme Court placed further
restrictions on Congress's abrogation power. The Court held that
Congressional authority under the Fourteenth Amendment is not
unlimited:. In Boerne, the Court found that the Religious Freedom

Restoration Act of 1993"7 was beyond Congress's power to enact such a
law under the Fourteenth Amendment Enforcement Clause. 58 According
to the Court, Congress's legislative power was only "remedial."5 9 When
exercising its legislative powers, Congress "must do so to remedy an
already existing constitutional violation ....
Accordingly, Congressional
power under Section 5 is limited to preparing, creating, or establishing a
proportionate remedy to a Constitutional violation already found by the

Supreme Court." 6 A law is found to be an appropriate use of
Congressional power under the Fourteenth Amendment "(1) if it may be
regarded as an enactment to enforce the Equal Protection Clause, (2) if it

is plainly adapted to that end, and (3) if it is not prohibited
by but is
6'
[sic]."
constitution
the
of
spirit
and
letter
the
with
consistent

51. 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
52. Id. at 59 (holding that "through the Fourteenth Amendment, federal power extended to
intrude upon the province of the Eleventh Amendment and therefore that § 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment allowed Congress to abrogate the immunity from suit guaranteed by that
Amendment"); see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5 ("The Congress shall have power to enforce,
by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.").
53. 517 U.S. at 55 (citation omitted); see also Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S.
234, 246 (1985) (ruling that "[a] general authorization for suit in federal court is not the kind of
unequivocal statutory language sufficient to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment").
54. 517 U.S. at 55 (citation omitted).
55. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
56. Jd. at 518.
57. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-2000bb-4 (2001).
58. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 536.
59. Id. at 519.
60. Friedman, supra note 28, at 248, 248-49 (footnote omitted) (noting that "Congress cannot
declare what the Constitution means and afford a remedy for violations" and "since the Fourteenth
Amendment speaks to the states, and Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Enabling Act, is
the vehicle by which Congress passes these laws, what Boerne really says to Congress is you have
to be very careful when you exercise that power" (footnote omitted)).
61. Mills v. Maine, 118 F.3d 37, 45 (1st Cir. 1997) (quotation marks omitted).
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C. Ex parte Young
The sovereign immunity of a state has been limited by the Ex parte
Young doctrine. In Ex parte Young,62 the Supreme Court permitted suits
seeking injunctive relief against state officials acting in their official
capacities in federal court.63 Courts have expanded this doctrine to
include suits against state officials for prospective and declaratory
relief.64 For the Ex parte Young doctrine to apply, the lawsuit must name
the state official and not the state agency or the state itself as a
defendant." The purpose of the Ex parte Young doctrine is to prevent
state officials from using Eleventh Amendment immunity to avoid
compliance with federal laws. 66 This doctrine is not without limitations.
If a court determines that a state is the real party in interest, the suit is
barred by the Eleventh Amendment "regardless of the relief sought." 67 In
determining the real party in interest, a court will look at the nature of
the relief sought:
Lawsuits seeking retroactive relief, usually in the form of monetary
damages and declaratory judgment for past conduct, against a state
official are generally construed as suits against the State because a
judgment for damages against an official would necessarily require
payment from the government. However, it is clear that "a state official
in is his or her official capacity, when sued for injunctive relief, would
for
be a person under § 1983 because 'official capacity actions
68
prospective relief are not treated as actions against the State.'
Therefore, a state official can be sued in his official capacity for
prospective relief, such as injunctions and declaratory judgments.69 In
such instances, the Eleventh Amendment is not at issue.

62. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
63. Id. at 159.
64. Balgowan v. New Jersey, 115 F.3d 214, 217 (3d Cir. 1997).
65. Doe v. Div. of Youth & Family Servs., 148 F. Supp. 2d 462, 483 (D.N.J. 2001).
66. See id.; see also Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 68 (1985) (holding there is no Eleventh
Amendment bar to claims seeking prospective relief that would "prevent a continuing violation of
federal law").
67. Doe, 148 F. Supp. 2d at 483.
68. Id. at 483-84 (citations omitted).
69. See id. at 484. There are limitations on the availability of declaratory relief. A plaintiff can
not get a declaratory judgment stating that the state official's prior conduct violated a federal law.
See id.
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III. LIMITATION ON STATE EMPLOYEES' RIGHTS
The Supreme Court, beginning with its decision in Seminole Tribe
of Floridav. Florida,0 and its subsequent decisions in Alden v. Maine,7"
Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents,7 and Board of Trustees of the
University of Alabama v. Garrett,73 restricted Congress's power using
the underlying principle of federalism. "Congress treat[s] the States in a
manner consistent with their status as residuary sovereigns and joint
participants in the governance of the Nation. 74 The Supreme Court
applied principles of federalism to restrict the power of Congress to
subject states to federal labor and employment statutes. The- practical
effect of Seminole, Alden, Kimel, and Garrettwas to
limit the enforceability of federal law against the states. In federal
court, the states are protected by Eleventh Amendment immunity,
which Congress cannot lift using its Article I powers. In their own
courts, states can now assert the constitutionally based sovereign
immunity doctrine. Of course ... the supremacy of federal law might
be achieved by the good faith of the states in honoring federal
requirements.75
The principle of federalism was emphasized in Seminole, and later
in Alden, where the Supreme Court held that it was unfair to subject
76
states to private suits based on federal law claims. In Alden, a group of
employees filed suit against the State of Maine, their employer, alleging
violations of the FLSA, and subsequently the state court dismissed the
complaint on the basis of sovereign immunity. 77 The issue before the
United States Supreme Court was whether Congress had "the power,
under Article I, to subject nonconsenting States to private suits in their
own courts. 78 The Alden Court was concerned that subjecting states to
70.

517 U.S. 44(1996).

71. 527 U.S. 706 (1999).
72. 528 U.S. 62 (2000).
73. 531 U.S. 356 (2001).
74. Alden, 527 U.S. at 748.
75. Braveman', supra note 22, at 647 (footnotes omitted). The author also observes that
[a]fter Alden, there is no real cost to the state for ignoring federal law. Absent the threat
of damages, the state has little, if any, incentive to align its policies with federal
requirements. State officials can ignore federal requirements, confident that if they are
sued and lose they simply will be directed to comply in the future.
Id. at 648 (footnotes omitted).
76. See generally Alden, 527 U.S. at 749, 750.
77. Id.
at 712.
78. Id. at 730.
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suits for damages would give "Congress a power and a leverage over the
States that is not contemplated by our constitutional design."7 9 The Court
held that Article I of the Constitution does not grant power to Congress
to subject nonconsenting states to suits for damages."' According to the
Court, states are sovereign entities immune from suits to which they
have not consented. 8'
However, the Supreme Court pointed out that a state's sovereign
immunity is not absolute.8 2 First, immunity under the Eleventh
Amendment is valid only in the absence of a state's consent.83 Once a
state consents, it waives its sovereign immunity, which can arise from a
state's own initiative, from a constitutional amendment, or from
legislation pursuant to Congress's power under the Fourteenth
Amendment." Second, the Court reasoned that protection of sovereign
immunity did not extend to lesser state entities, such as municipal
corporations or other state agencies that are not considered arms of the
state.85 Third, in actions seeking injunctive or declaratory relief, states
cannot claim sovereign immunity.86 Fourth, suits for monetary damages
for violations of federal laws could be brought against state officials in
their personal capacity.87
In Alden, the Supreme Court did not consider the effect of its ruling
on an individual's rights to redress wrongs committed by a state in
violation of federal laws.8 The Court left state employees with rights,
but no remedies. The Court disregarded the fact that although states are
sovereign entities, there is a "fundamental concept that the 'will' of state
citizens should be viewed to include federal law."8 Thus, this ruling
denies state employees the full protection of federal employment laws.

79. Id. at 750.
80. Id. 712.
81. Alden, 527 U.S. at 754.
82. Id. at 755.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 755-56.
85. Id. at 756.
86. Alden, 527 U.S. at 757.
87. Id. Suits of this nature do not violate sovereign immunity since "a suit for money damages
may be prosecuted against a state officer in his individual capacity for unconstitutional or wrongful
conduct fairly attributable to the officer himself, so long as the relief is sought not from the state
treasury but from the officer personally." Id.
88. See id. at 809 (Souter, J., dissenting).
89. Braveman, supra note 22, at 646. Braveman notes that Justice Kennedy, author of the
majority opinion, and Chief Justice Rehnquist, "two of the Court's strongest champions of states'
rights, previously recognized this basic proposition." Id.
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In Kimel, the Supreme Court held that the ADEA does not abrogate
a state's Eleventh Amendment immunity." Although the Court found
that Congress clearly intended to abrogate state immunity, Congress
acted in the absence of a valid exercise of power because age is not a
protected class under the Fourteenth Amendment. 9' As a result of this
decision, a state employee cannot sue her employer in federal court for
violations of the ADEA.
Congress's ability to subject a nonconsenting state to suit in federal
court was further restricted by the Supreme Court's holding in Garrett.
The Court held that suits in federal court by state employees to recover
money damages by reason of the state's failure to comply with Title I of
the ADA are barred by the Eleventh Amendment.92 Disparate treatment
by a state of individuals with disabilities does not necessarily amount to
a constitutional violation provided that the state has a rational basis for
such a policy. 93 The Court reasoned that enforcement of monetary
damages against a state for violations of the ADA would place an extra
burden on the state and its scarce resources. 9' The Supreme Court
concluded that Congress did not validly abrogate the states' sovereign
immunity from suits by private individuals for monetary damages under
the ADA because in order to do so "there must be a pattern of
discrimination by the States which violates the Fourteenth Amendment,
and the remedy imposed by Congress must be congruent and
proportional to the targeted violation.' 9'
Contrary to the majority's conclusion, the dissent pointed to an
extensive legislative record documenting society-wide discrimination
against persons with disabilities, 96 such as "instances in which a person
with a disability found it impossible to obtain a state job, to retain state
employment, .... or to obtain a public education, which is often a

90. 528 U.S. 62, 91 (2000).
91. See id. at 75-76, 91.
92. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 360 (2001).
93. Id. at 370.
94. Id. at 372.
"For example, whereas it would be entirely rational (and therefore constitutional) for a
state employer to conserve scarce financial resources by hiring employees who are able
to use existing facilities, the ADA requires employers to 'make existing facilities used by
employees readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities."'
Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. §§ 12112(5)(B), 12111(9) (2001)).
95. Id. at 374.
96. See Garrett, 531 U.S. at 377. Congress created a special task force to aid in the gathering
of data on employment discrimination against the disabled. Id. The task force held hearings in every
state which were attended by more than 30,000 people. Id.
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prerequisite to obtaining employment."97 Additional data analyzed by
Congress, such as the census and other national polls, led Congress to
the conclusion that "'people with disabilities, as a group, occupy an
inferior status in our society, and are severely disadvantaged socially,
vocationally, economically, and educationally."'
The ADA, an important civil rights law, was a product of a
bipartisan legislative process.99 It is argued that the Court's decision in
Garrett substantially curbed Congress's power under Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment.' °° The Garrett decision creates an assumption
that the courts "will give Congress less flexibility when it comes to
discrimination on the basis of age, disability or other categories 'where
the background norms are not so easily agreed on. '""9 '
Therefore, the implications of the Supreme Court's recent decisions
in Seminole, and its subsequent holdings in Alden, °3 Kimel,"'4 and
°5 deprive a state employee of the same rights guaranteed to
Garrett,"
federal, private, or local employee. As a result of these rulings, a state
employee is barred from bringing a suit in federal court against her
employer, the state.

97. Id. at 379.
98. Id. at 378 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(6)). "Congress spent years compiling a record of
the extent of discrimination against people with disabilities, both in society at large and specifically
as the result of government policies that created and perpetuated patterns of segregation, exclusion
and lack of access to public services." Linda Greenhouse, The High Court'sTarget: Congress, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 25, 2001, § 4, at 3.
99. Greenhouse, supra note 98, at 3 (finding that "the Americans With Disabilities Act, the
most important civil rights law of the last quarter-century, was the highly visible product of a
bipartisan legislative process, so much so that some people assumed the law might stand as a
firewall against the court's further expansion of state immunity").
100. Id.
101. Id. (quoting Marci Hamilton).
102. 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (holding that Congress cannot use its Commerce Clause powers to
abrogate a state's Eleventh Amendment immunity).
103. 527 U.S. 706 (1999) (holding that the FLSA was passed pursuant to Congress's
Commerce Clause powers and, therefore, is not a valid abrogation of Eleventh Amendment
immunity).
104. 528 U.S. 62 (2000) (holding that the ADEA is not a valid abrogation of a state's Eleventh
Amendment immunity).
105. 531 U.S. 356 (2001) (holding that the ADA is not a valid abrogation of a state's Eleventh
Amendment immunity).
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IV. ELEVENTH AMENDMENT SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY IN THE
FEDERAL COURTS
In Wisconsin Department of Corrections v. Schacht,"" the Supreme

Court held that the dismissal of one federal law claim based on
immunity does not preclude a federal court from adjudicating any
remaining federal and state law claims. 7 Schacht filed suit against a
state agency in state court raising federal and state claims.0 8 The State

removed the case to federal court, and in its answer raised the defense of
Eleventh Amendment immunity.' 9 The issue before the Court involved
the resolution of state law claims following the dismissal of the federal

claim upon which subject matter jurisdiction was based."
Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion raised the issue of whether a

state "by giving its express consent to removal of the case from state
court ....

waived

its Eleventh

Amendment

immunity."' "'

Justice

Kennedy asserted that a state must be responsible for its own acts. " '
Therefore, a state's affirmative act of removal should preclude it from
claiming Eleventh Amendment immunity." 3 If a state is allowed to

remove a properly filed state court claim to federal court it would permit

106. 524 U.S. 381 (1998).
107. Id. at 392-93; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (2001).
[I]n any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction, the district
courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to
claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case
or controversy under Article III
of the United States Constitution.
28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).
108. Schacht, 524 U.S. at 383.
109. Id. at 384. The federal removal statute allows a defendant to remove
any civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United States
have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or the defendants, to the
district court of the United States for the district and division embracing the place where
such action is pending.
28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (2001).
110. Schacht, 524 U.S. at 383; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (2001).
Any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction founded on a claim
or right arising under the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United States shall be
removable without regard to the citizenship or residence of the parties. Any other such
action shall be removable only if none of the parties in interest properly joined and
served as defendants is a citizen of the State in which such action is brought.
28 U.S.C. § 1441(b).
I11. Schacht, 524 U.S. at 393 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
112. Id.at393.
113. Id.
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the belated assertion of the Eleventh Amendment bar ....

[and would]

allow States to proceed to judgment without facing any real risk of
adverse consequences. Should the State prevail, the plaintiff would be
bound by principles of res judicata. If the State were to lose, however,
it could 4void the entire judgment simply by asserting its immunity on
appeal.1
According to Justice Kennedy, waiver of immunity is treated as a
"hybrid" of personal jurisdiction and subject matter jurisdiction."5
Removal is akin to personal jurisdiction requirements because "it can be
waived and courts need not raise the issue sua sponte."' 6 However, some
courts treat Eleventh Amendment immunity similarly to subject matter
jurisdiction, allowing it to be raised at anytime during the proceedings." 7
Justice Kennedy suggests that courts should require the state to raise the
Eleventh Amendment immunity defense at the "outset of the
proceedings" ' 18 or lose the ability to raise it as a defense." 9 Justice
Kennedy's reasoning was based on prior Supreme Court decisions
holding that a state voluntarily waives its Eleventh Amendment
immunity when the state intervenes in a federal action or files an action
in federal court.' 20 Justice Kennedy noted:
Since a State which is made a defendant to a state-court action is under
no compulsion to appear in federal court and, like any other defendant,
has the unilateral right to block removal of the case, any appearance
the State makes in federal court may well be regarded as
121

Currently, there is no uniform treatment of removal and waiver by
the circuit courts. The Seventh and the Tenth Circuits treat removal as an
unequivocal and express waiver of a state's sovereign immunity. 2 2 The
Second, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits view Eleventh Amendment23
immunity as a jurisdictional issue similar to subject matter jurisdiction.'
When immunity is treated as subject matter jurisdiction, a defendant

114. Id. at 394.
115. Id.
116. Schacht, 524 U.S. at 394 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
117. See id.
118. Id. at 395.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Schacht, 524 U.S. at 395-96 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
122. See infra notes 126-27 and accompanying text.
123. See infra notes 128-35 and accompanying text,
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may raise the issue at anytime in the proceedings, 2 4 even on appeal. The
First, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits look beyond removal itself and inquire
into the conduct of the defendant to determine if immunity was
waived. 25
Justice Kennedy is not alone in advocating the treatment of removal
as an express and unequivocal waiver of immunity. His proposition is
supported by at least two circuit courts. The Seventh Circuit found that a
state waives its immunity when it voluntarily enters the federal court
system, thus barring itself from raising the defense of immunity. 126 The
Tenth Circuit agrees with Justice Kennedy that "an unequivocal intent to
waive immunity seems clear when a state, facing suit in its own courts,
purposefully seeks a federal forum.', 127 Therefore, within these circuits,
removal alone is sufficient to constitute an unequivocal waiver of
immunity.
The Second, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits have held that a state
must expressly consent to treat its removal as a waiver of immunity;
therefore, failure to raise the defense at the outset of the case does not
bar the later assertion of immunity. 28' The Second Circuit, in Richardson
v. New York State Department of Corrections,' held that the failure of
the state to raise an immunity defense in its answer did not amount to a
waiver. 3 ° The court stated that "Eleventh Amendment immunity may
differ from other jurisdictional bars, [but] the law remains clear that it is
jurisdictional enough that it need not be raised in the trial court."' 3' In the
Sixth Circuit, a party's failure to raise
Eleventh Amendment immunity at
• 132
the outset is not considered a waiver. Furthermore, because immunity
124. See Schacht, 524 U.S. at 394 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
125. See infra notes 136-70 and accompanying text.
126. Dekalb County Div. of Family & Children Servs. (In re Platter), 140 F.3d 676, 680 (7th
Cir. 1998). The court held that "[tihe Eleventh Amendment does not prevent a state from entering a
federal forum voluntarily to pursue its own interest. However, if a state embarks down this route, it
cannot run back to seek Eleventh Amendment protection when it does not like the result." Id.
(citation omitted).
127. Sutton v. Utah State Sch. for the Deaf& Blind, 173 F.3d 1226, 1234 (10th Cir. 1999); see
also McLaughlin v. Bd. of Trs. of State Coils. of Colo., 215 F.3d 1168, 1170 (10th Cir. 2000)
(finding that intentional invocation of federal jurisdiction acted as a waiver of Eleventh Amendment
immunity).
128. E.g., Lapides v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Ga., 251 F.3d 1372 (1 lth Cir. 2001),
cert. granted,70 U.S.L.W. 3314 (2001); Reese v. Michigan, No. 99-1173, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS
27404, at *1 (6th Cir. Oct. 24, 2000), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 1231 (2001); Richardson v. N.Y. State
Dep't of Corr., 180 F.3d 426 (2d Cir. 1999).
129. 180 F.3d at 426.
130. ld. at 449.
131. Id.
132. Reese, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 27404, at *6-*7.
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is a limitation on the power of a court, a court may raise the issue sua
sponte.'33 In Lapides v. Board of Regents of the University System of
removal of
Georgia,'34 the Eleventh Circuit held that a state's voluntary
35
an action to federal court is not a waiver of its immunity.'
Decisions within the First Circuit hold that removal alone does not
constitute a waiver of immunity; there must be additional conduct by the
37
state. 36 In Candela Corp. v. Regents of the University of California,
the district court held that when a state voluntarily removes the case to
federal court, answers the complaint and opposes a motion to remand,
the state has "clearly and unequivocally" waived its immunity.'38 The
First Circuit does not view the Eleventh Amendment as akin to subject
can be waived; subject matter
matter jurisdiction because immunity
39
jurisdiction can never be waived.
The Eighth Circuit inquires into the conduct of a state to determine
whether immunity was waived.' 40 Active litigation on the merits by a
state is found to be a waiver of immunity. 4' The Eighth Circuit has held
133. Id. at*7.
134. 251 F.3d 1372 (11th Cir. 2001), cert. granted,70 U.S.L.W. 3314 (2001).
135. Id. at 1378.
136. E.g., Paul N. Howard Co. v. P.R. Aqueduct Sewer Auth., 744 F.2d 880, 886 (lst Cir.
1984) (holding that when a state appears in federal court, defends on the merits, and files
counterclaims, the state voluntarily waives its immunity); Newfield House, Inc. v. Mass. Dep't of
Pub. Welfare, 651 F.2d 32, 36 n.3 (1st Cir. 1981) (discussing that removal to federal court is a
waiver of immunity and the defendants untimely invocation of the Eleventh Amendment defense is
"a virtual fraud on the federal court and opposing litigants"); Inacom Corp. v. Massachusetts, 2 F.
Supp. 2d 150, 152 (D. Mass. 1998) ("The Eleventh Amendment bars civil actions for money
damages against a state, its subdivisions, or its officials, except where a state has acted to reduce or
eliminate its sovereign immunity."); see also Ford Motor Co. v. Dep't of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459
(1945) (holding that the state's constitution required that waiver of immunity must be done by the
passage of a law by the state legislature). But see Parker v. Universidad de Puerto Rico, 225 F.3d 1,
8-9 (1st Cir. 2000) (holding that if the defendant fails to raise an Eleventh Amendment defense, a
court has discretion to raise the issue sua sponte; and should a state decide to raise the issue de novo
on appeal, it must do so in a timely manner).
137. 976 F. Supp. 90 (D. Mass. 1997).
138. Id. at 92-93; see also Garrity v. Sununu, 752 F.2d 727, 738 (1st Cir. 1984) (stating that the
court will look to a state's conduct to determine if it waived its immunity).
139. Parella v. Ret. Bd. of the R.I. Employees' Ret. Sys., 173 F.3d 46, 55 (1stCir. 1999). The
court held that:
Eleventh Amendment immunity can be waived. Furthermore, while courts have the
discretion to raise Eleventh Amendment questions sua sponte, Article III does not
obligate them to do so. These two aspects of Eleventh Amendment doctrine suggest that
the Eleventh Amendment is just as much a grant of immunity (i.e., a type of defense) as
it is a limitation on courts' jurisdiction.
Id. (citations omitted).
140. See, e.g., SDDS, Inc. v. South Dakota (In re SDDS, Inc.), 225 F.3d 970, 972-73 (8th Cir.
2000), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 1733 (2001).
141. See id.
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that "'[a] state may 42
... waive its Eleventh Amendment immunity
through its conduct.",1

A Ninth Circuit federal district court, in California Mother Infant
Program v. California Department of Corrections,43 noted that "[t]he
agency took the affirmative act of removing this case to federal court
and it then opposed plaintiff's attempt to remand the case to state court.
Where there was no need to take these actions .... the agency expressly
waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity."'" The court treated the
agency's actions following removal as if the agency waived its
immunity by intentionally invoking federal jurisdiction. 45 The court
justified its decision by 46noting that the agency faced no prejudice by
remaining in state court.'
In Spingola v. Regents of the University of California"4 and
Watkins v. CaliforniaDepartment of Corrections,'4 the courts stated that
removal alone is not the determinative factor of whether the state waived
its immunity.'4 9 In both cases, the plaintiffs filed suit in state court
arguing both state and federal law claims.'5 ° The defendants removed the
actions to federal court and claimed immunity under the Eleventh
Amendment.' 5 ' Both plaintiffs argued that the defendants waived their
immunity by removing the cases to federal court.'5 2 The Spingola court
found that the State did not waive its immunity from suit through
removal because the State raised immunity as a defense before litigating
on the merits. '
The Spingola court, in reaffirming the holding in Watkins, held that
in order to determine if a state waived its immunity, one should not look
at removal, but should consider whether or not the defendant actively
litigated on the merits. 'i1 In Watkins, the court held that
removing a case to a federal forum does not automatically waive a
state's Eleventh Amendment immunity with respect to all of the claims
142. Id. at 973 (quoting Hankins v. Finnel, 964 F.2d 853, 856 (8th Cir. 1992)).
143. 41 F. Supp. 2d 1123 (S.D. Cal. 1999).
144. Id. at 1129.
145. Id.

146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

ld.
No. C 99-1076, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17378, at *I(N.D. Cal. Nov. 21, 2000).
100 F. Supp. 2d. 1227 (C.D. Cal. 2000).
Spingola, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17378, at *20; Watkins, 100 F.Supp. 2d at 1231.
Spingola, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17378, at *6; Watkins, 100 F. Supp. 2d at 1228.

151.

Spingola, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17378, at *7; Watkins, 100 F. Supp. 2d at 1228.

152. Spingola, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17378, at *12; Watkins, 100 F.Supp. 2d at 1230.
153. Spingola, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17378, at *16.
154. Id. at*18.
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According to Justice Kennedy, removing a case to federal court is
similar to a state's voluntary intervention into an already existing federal
action.'"
Viewing Eleventh Amendment immunity as personal jurisdiction
would not be a reach for the courts. Originally, the Eleventh Amendment
was thought of as a "personal privilege, which [a state] may waive at
[its] pleasure."' 99 Furthermore, there is clear indication from the courts
that the Eleventh Amendment is not akin to subject matter jurisdiction.
In Edelman v. Jordan,2°° the court viewed the Eleventh Amendment as
depriving the federal courts of subject matter jurisdiction. 2° ' However, in
Schacht, the Court returned to its original view of the Eleventh
Amendment as a personal privilege that may be waived by a state.0 2
B. The ProposedAmendment of the ADEA
"Age discrimination continues to damage our society, reducing
both the incomes and the self-confidence of millions of Americans. 20 3
According to surveys, millions of Americans are forced into early
retirement. ° Surprisingly, age discrimination continues because of the
assumption that it is proper for older workers to make room for those
who are younger.205

198. Id. at 395 (holding that when the state voluntarily intervenes in an action in federal court,
it is barred from claiming Eleventh Amendment immunity) (citing Clark v. Barnard, 108 U.S. 436,
447-48 (1883)); see also Gardner v. New Jersey, 329 U.S. 565, 574 (1947) (holding that the state
waived its sovereign immunity when it voluntarily appeared in bankruptcy court to file a
complaint).
199. Barnard,108 U.S. at 447.
200. 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
201. See id. at 678.
202. Schacht, 524 U.S. at 389. The Supreme Court held that
[t]he Eleventh Amendment... does not automatically destroy original jurisdiction.
Rather, the Eleventh Amendment grants the State a legal power to assert a sovereign
immunity defense should it choose to do so. The State can waive the defense. Nor need a
court raise the defect on its own. Unless the State raises the matter, a court can ignore it.

Id.
203.

ADMINISTRATION ON AGING, AGE DISCRIMINATION:

A PERVASIVE AND DAMAGING

at http://www.aoa.dhhs.gov/factsheets/ageism.html (last visited Nov. 20, 2001).
204. Id. According to a 1989 survey, one million workers age fifty to sixty-four believed that
they would be forced into early retirement. Id. A 1992 survey showed that 5.4 million older
Americans were unemployed because they were unable to find suitable employment. Id.
205. Id. The report notes that "for a variety of reasons, older workers have been leaving the
labor force. The percentage of men 55 to 64 in the work force declined from 87 percent in 1950 to
67 percent in 1996, and for men 65 and older, from 46 percent to 16 percent." Id.
INFLUENCE,
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Congress, in response to the Supreme Court rulings in Kimel and
206 proposed to
Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett,
20 7
amend the ADEA.
This bipartisan proposal would allow a state
employee to sue her employer, the state, in federal court for violation of
federal employment laws.20 ' The purpose of this bill is

(1) to provide to State employees in programs or activities that
receive or use Federal financial assistance the same rights and
remedies for practices violating the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967 as are available to other employees
under that Act, and that were available to State employees prior to
the Supreme Court's decision in Kimel v. Florida Board of
Regents... ;

(2) to provide that the receipt or use of Federal financial assistance
for a program or activity constitutes a State waiver of sovereign
immunity from suits by employees within that program or activity
for violations of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of
1967; and
(3) to affirm that suits for injunctive relief are available against
State officials in their official capacities for violations of the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967.2
To ensure that state employees have a remedy guaranteed by the
ADEA, the bill conditions the receipt of federal funds upon a state's
waiver of its Eleventh Amendment immunity.2 0 Moreover, the bill
proposes to amend the ADEA so that a state's receipt and acceptance of
federal funds constitutes a waiver of its imunity. 2 ' The proposed
legislation would amend the ADEA to allow a state official to be sued in
206. 531 U.S. 356 (2001).
207. S. 928, 107th Cong. (2001), available at http://thomas.loc.gov.
208. Id.
209. Id. at § 3.
210. Id. at § 3(2).
211. Id. at § 4. Therefore, anyone employed by a state agency that receives federal financial
assistance may sue his or her employer, the state, in federal court for violations of the ADEA.
However, if the state agency chooses not to waive its immunity, that state agency will lose federal
funding. For example, New York receives approximately $26.2 billion a year in federal funding,
which it allocates to various state agencies. E-mail from Frank Mauro, Executive Director, Fiscal
Policy Institute, to Bonnie A. Tucker (Nov. 7, 2001, 11:34:46 EST) (on file with the Hofstra Labor
& Employment Law Journal) (interpreting the Financial Plan Overview, which summarizes the
Governor's Executive Budget for 2001-02).
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in the case. Where the state has removed a case to federal court in
order to ensure that the federal claims in the case are adjudicated by a
federal tribunal, but has all the while made clear its intention to assert
sovereign immunity as to the other, state-law claims, the state has not
unequivocally indicated its consent to have the state-law claims
adjudicated in a federal forum.

The court stated that it would find an implied waiver of immunity
"proper" only when the state was "guilty of... abusive tactical
maneuvering ...with respect to the state law claims.', 5 6 Therefore, this
Ninth Circuit federal district court analyzed removal and waiver on a
case-by-case basis.
However, in dicta, the Watkins court reasoned that the state would
not be allowed to claim immunity after a judgment has been entered.
The court stated that
[t]he reason for construing a state's decision actively to litigate its case
as an implied waiver of immunity is clear. If a state were allowed first
to litigate the merits of its case but then to assert immunity after
becoming dissatisfied with the proceedings, the state could make
unfair offensive use of its Eleventh Amendment shield. Such conduct
would "undermine the integrity of the judicial system." When a state
seeks to abuse its Eleventh Amendment immunity merely to obtain an
improper tactical advantage, the federal courts may prevent that abuse
by construing the state's earlier invocation of federal jurisdiction as an
implied waiver of the state's Eleventh Amendment rights.'57
In the Ninth Circuit decision, Hill v. Blind Industries and Services

of Maryland,' the plaintiff filed a federal law claim in federal court
against the defendant, an arm of the state. 59 Prior to trial, the defendant
filed an answer, a motion to dismiss, participated in discovery, attended

pretrial

conferences,

prepared

witness

lists, and proposed jury

instructions.'6 On the day of trial, the defendant asserted, for the first

time, an Eleventh Amendment immunity defense.' 6' The plaintiff argued
that by participating in extensive pretrial motions and activities, the
defendant waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity' 2 The' district
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.

Watkins, 100 F. Supp. 2d at 1231.
Id.
Id. (citation omitted).
No. 97-55382, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 35237, *1 (9th Cir. June 4, 1999).
Id.at *2.
Id. at *2-*3.
Id. at*3.
Id.
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court allowed the trial to continue and a verdict was reached for the
plaintiff."' The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals found that by waiting
until trial to claim immunity and engaging in pretrial litigation, the State
waived its immunity.'6 The court stated that there was "no valid reason
why a party should belatedly be permitted to assert Eleventh
Amendment immunity.' 65 By claiming immunity on the day of trial,
[the defendant] had the best of both worlds. If [the defendant]
prevailed at trial, it could withdraw its motion and let the jury verdict
stand. If [the defendant] lost at trial, it could ask to have the verdict set
aside on the ground that the action was barred by the Eleventh
Amendment. 166
This tactic is an example of what Justice Kennedy discussed in his
concurring opinion in Schacht. If active participation in the litigation is
not seen as a waiver, the defendant is receiving a procedural
advantage. 6 1 If a court is to allow the defendant to wait until the last
possible minute to raise an Eleventh Amendment defense, this would
undermine[] the integrity of the judicial system. It also wastes judicial
resources, burdens jurors and witnesses, and imposes substantial costs
upon the litigants. In addition, when an Eleventh Amendment defense
is first raised late in the case, the record may be inadequate to permit
informed appellate review, and the plaintiff may
have difficulty
68
obtaining evidence necessary to oppose the motion.
The purpose behind the federal rules of procedure is to prevent such
abuses of judicial resources and to prevent one party from gaining an

163. Hill, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 35237, at *3.
164. Id.; see also Clark v. California, 123 F.3d 1267, 1271 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that a state
may waive its immunity by accepting federal funds).
165. Hill, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 35237, at *8.
166. Id. at *4.
167. Id. at *8-*9.
If a state or state agency elects to defend on the merits in federal court, it should be held
to that choice the same as any other litigant. We find persuasive Justice Kennedy's
thoughtful concurrence in Wisconsin Dep't of Correctionsv. Schacht, which proposes a
similar rule. To permit a defendant to litigate the case on the merits, and then belatedly
claim Eleventh Amendment immunity to avoid an adverse result, would "work a virtual
fraud on the federal court and opposing litigants."
Id. (citations omitted).
168. Id. at*4.
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improper advantage over the party.16 The Hill court had a simple
solution-if a state does not wish to be in a federal forum, then it "can
quickly make its objections known and obtain a ruling on that
defense."'7 0
V. SOLUTIONS TO GUARANTEE STATE EMPLOYEES' RIGHTS

A. The Civil ProcedureFix
To resolve the inconsistencies among the federal circuit courts,
there needs to be a change in the treatment of the Eleventh Amendment
immunity following removal to these courts. To protect the federal rights
of state employees and provide them remedies equal to those available to
federal, private, or local employees, voluntary removal by states to
federal court must be interpreted as an unequivocal and express waiver
of a state's sovereign immunity. Furthermore, immunity should be
treated as personal jurisdiction; if a party does not raise it in the initial
federal court proceeding, it is waived.
Changing the treatment of the Eleventh Amendment immunity
would effectively eliminate the unfair advantage given to states when
they remove claims to federal court.' Currently, states are given a
second bite at the apple. Even if a state voluntarily removes a claim to
federal court, some circuits do not consider the removal a waiver of
immunity.' In these circuits, a state can litigate on the merits and await
final judgment before claiming immunity.'73 Another obstacle imposed
on the plaintiff is the statute of limitations, which may prevent the
relitigation of the suit in state court.' 74 Furthermore, the plaintiff is faced
with the burden of additional litigation expenses. Finally, the plaintiff
faces a delay in receiving any possible remedies.
Assuming a plaintiff can overcome these obstacles, the damages
available in state court are limited. For example, damages available in
state court for violations of federal employment laws are limited to only
169. See Hill, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 35237, at *5.For example, "[d]efects in personal
jurisdiction, venue, or service of process are waived unless asserted in a party's initial pleading.
Removal and remand are likewise governed by strict time limits." Id. (citation omitted).
170. Id. at*14.
171. See supra notes 9-19 and accompanying text.
172. See supra notes 128-35 and accompanying text.
173. Id.
174. See generally Regents of the Univ. of Minn. v. Raygor, 620 N.W.2d 680 (Minn. 2001),
cert. granted, 121 S. Ct. 2214 (2001).
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injunctive and declaratory relief.'5 Despite the courts' confidence that
injunctive relief is a "sufficient mechanism for policing state deviations
from federal constitutional and statutory norms,"' 7 6 the enforcement of
injunctive relief is difficult to obtain. Litigants may have problems
identifying the officials responsible for misconduct; and, thus, would be
unable to determine to whom an injunctive order should be directed.'
Assuming that such a person is identified, "restrictive standing
limitations on who can seek an injunction may preclude [the litigant]
from seeking state compliance in the first place."' 7' Even if a litigant is
successful and gets the complaint into court, by the time the lawsuit is
over, injunctive relief may have little effect or benefit, especially if the
plaintiff "experienced only a single, isolated incident of state
misconduct."'' 79 Moreover, it can be argued that injunctive relief provides
an inadequate incentive for private citizens to bear the cost and burden
of litigation. 80 "Citizens may be wary of incurring litigation costs, both
financial and psychological, without the possibility of a substantial
monetary pay off."' 8
As previously discussed, the Supreme Court reasoned that
subjecting states to monetary damages would place an unfair burden on
their finances. ' However, the Court disregarded the fact that without the
risk of being held financially responsible for violations of federal
employment statutes, there is an extremely low probability that states
will make any substantial efforts to monitor and enforce federal
employment anti-discrimination laws.
Absent monetary sanctions, states will not be likely to be pressured by
citizens to change their practices. However, should a substantial
damage remedy be levied against the state, the threat of increased taxes
or budgetary constraints in other programs might spark citizen ire, thus
increasing the chances that states would make concerted efforts to
avoid such controversy or embarrassment. Hence, because prospective

175. See supra notes 62-69 and accompanying text.
176. Hamrick, supra note 34, at 911.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 912-13.
181. Hamrick, supra note 34, at 913. The author explains that litigants asserting their rights
under federal employment statutes "may perceive the costs of being deposed, producing documents,
answering interrogatories or testifying at trial as considerably outweighing the benefits of mere
injunctive relief." Id.
182. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
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relief is too weak of an incentive for state compliance, damage
remedies may be the only viable deterrent of state dereliction. s3
Courts contend that the Eleventh Amendment does not interfere
with a litigant's ability to sue state officials for violations of federal laws
in state courts.1 4 However, many restrictions reduce the possibility of a
litigant recovering monetary judgments from state officials."5 For
example, in actions for monetary damages, certain state officials may
raise a personal immunity defense.'86 Other state officials, such as
judges, are also entitled to immunity from suits seeking declaratory and
injunctive relief.'
Another argument against the need to expand federal employment
statutes to state employees is that state employees receive adequate and
fair protection under state employment discrimination statutes, and
therefore do not suffer substantial harm by being excluded from federal
discrimination laws. 88 For example, in Kimel, the majority stated that
"[s]tate employees are protected by state age discrimination statutes, and
may recover money damages from their state employers, in almost every
State of the Union." 89
Where an employee files a disability discrimination claim under the
ADA, the remedies available to that employee include injunctive relief,
reinstatement, reasonable accommodation, back pay, attorney's fees,
compensatory damages, and punitive damages.88 Under many state laws,
state employees are expressly excluded from recovering punitive
damages from state employers. 9' As a result, state employees are not
receiving adequate remedies under state laws, as compared to what they
would receive under federal employment laws. These employees are in
need of federal protection.
183. Hamrick, supra note 34, at 912.
184. Braveman, supra note 22, at 636.
185. Id. at 649.
186. Id.
187. Id. "[A]ctions seeking damages against public officials can be heard by juries, which may
be reluctant to impose personal liability on individuals attempting to perform their public duties."
Id.
188. See Kimel, 528 U.S. at 91.
189. Id.
190. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (2001).
191. E.g., FLA. STAT. ch. 760.11(5) (2001) (limiting punitive damages to $100,000); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 44-1005(k) (2000) (limiting punitive damages to $2000); TEX. LAB. CODE §
21.2585(b) (2000) (stating that "[a] complainant may recover punitive damages against a
respondent, other than a respondent that is a governmental entity"); see also State v. Goss, 42
S.W.3d 440, 442, 443 (Ark. 2001) (holding that a state employee in state court suing for age
discrimination is not entitled to monetary damages).
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By placing numerous limitations on the enforcement of federal
employment laws, the courts overlook concerns that the states "will fail
to police themselves or to offer adequate redress for their own
wrongdoing."'92 There is more than enough evidence indicating that
states, in comparison to the federal government, are less responsive to
the rights of minorities."93 In Kimel, the Supreme Court opined that
entities such as the federal government are not precluded by Eleventh
Amendment jurisprudence from bringing actions against the states for
violation of federal employment laws.'94 However, Congress emphasized
that there is a crucial need for private enforcement, even when the
federal government is capable of bringing the suit.' 95
Congress passed the ADA, the ADEA, and the FLSA to protect
employees regardless of where they are employed. These acts provide
remedies, including recovery of monetary damages that should be
obtainable by any employee harmed. However, by not construing
removal as a waiver of states' sovereign immunity under the Eleventh
Amendment, courts deny state employees the rights and remedies
granted to them by Congress.
Another justification for treating removal as a waiver of sovereign
immunity is that a state should be held accountable for its voluntary
decision to remove a case to federal court. Once a state voluntarily
removes a case, the state becomes a party in federal court. The state
should be bound by its choice and should not escape the result by
'
subsequently claiming the benefits of Eleventh Amendment immunity. 96
As Justice Kennedy reasoned, "[i]t would seem simple enough to rule
that once a State consents to removal, it may not turn around and say the
Eleventh Amendment bars the jurisdiction of the federal court."' 97
192. Hamrick, supra note 34, at 904. The author explains that the court "insinuates that
because there is no reason to assume that states will act other than in 'good faith,' the need for broad
private enforcement of federal law against states is weakened concomitantly." Id.
193. See id. at 905. The author explains that
states tend to privilege industry and business interests, while Congress has been more
susceptible to interest group pressures from those concerned with such issues as
environmental conservation and urban planning. States may have a tradition of
respecting the rights of certain individuals under federal law, but this has not precluded
them from responding indifferently at times towards other interest groups protected by
federal legislation. An analysis of state action by the Court should at least be sensitive to
these concerns.
Id. at 904-05 (footnotes omitted).
194. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 96.
195. Hamrick, supra note 34, at 910.
196. Hill v. Blind Indus. & Servs. of Md., No. 97-55382, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 35237, at *18
(9th Cir. June 4, 1999).
197. Wisconsin Dep't of Corr. v. Schacht, 524 U.S. 381, 393 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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his official capacity for injunctive relief.2 2 Therefore, if a state decides
not to waive its Eleventh Amendment immunity, it loses its right to
receive federal funding 2 3
The Supreme Court, in South Dakota v. Dole,t 4 addressed the issue
of conditioning federal funding upon a state's waiver of its sovereign
immunity.2 5 The Court reasoned that indirect persuasion, such as
conditioning of federal funds, falls within constitutional boundaries. 6
The Supreme Court held that Congress has the authority and power to
condition the receipt of federal funding if four conditions are met: (1)
"the exercise of the spending power must be in pursuit of the 'general
welfare,' '2 1 (2) Congress must condition the receipt of federal funding
"unambiguously ....

enabl[ing] the States to exercise their choice

knowingly, cognizant of the consequences of their participation,"2 8 (3)
"that conditions on federal grants [must relate] 'to the federal interest in
particular national projects or programs,' 2' 9 and (4) there must be no
other constitutional provisions independently barring the conditional
grant of federal funds.220
In Dole, Congress conditioned the receipt of federal highway funds
on the states raising the drinking age to twenty-one. 2 South Dakota
challenged the law, arguing that it exceeded Congress's spending
power. 222 The Supreme Court held that it was a valid use of Congress's
spending power to persuade a state to voluntarily raise its drinking age.223
The Court found that Congress's spending power "is not limited by the
direct grants of legislative power found in the Constitution., 224 In
212. S. 928 § 4.
213. Id. at § 2.
214. 483 U.S. 203 (1987).
215. See generally id.
216. Id. at 207.
217. Id.
218. 483 U.S. at 207 (alteration in original) (quoting Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v.
Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17, n.13 (1981)); see also MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. 111.Commerce
Comm'n, 183 F.3d 558, 565 (7th Cir. 1999) (holding that "Congress may condition a state's receipt
of federal funds or participation in a federal program on the state's waiver of its immunity under the
Eleventh Amendment, as long as Congress expresses its intent to do so using unmistakably clear
language").
219. Dole, 483 U.S. at 207 (quoting Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S. 444, 461 (1978)).
220. Id. at 208.
221. Id. at 205.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 206 (quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 474 (1980)).
224. Dole, 483 U.S. at 207 (quoting United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 66 (1936)); see, e.g.,
Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996); see also Hamrick, supra note 34, at 888.
Seminole therefore can be read as providing for the possibility of waiver under the
Spending Clause when made explicit. Taken as a whole and viewed against the backdrop
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essence, "Congress may attach conditions on the receipt of federal
funds . .. 'upon compliance by the recipient with federal statutory and
administrative directives. ' ' 2 5 When Congress conditions federal funding

on a state's waiver of its Eleventh Amendment immunity, "it operates
'much in the nature of a contract: in return for federal funds, the States
agree to comply with federally imposed conditions.' 22 6 This contractual
relationship exists only when a state voluntarily and knowingly accepts
the terms of the contract, thereby giving the state a choice to either
waive its immunity and receive funds, or reject the funds and preserve
its immunity.227
In College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary
Education Expense Board,228 the Court narrowed the Dole doctrine. The
Dole doctrine is applicable when the following conditions are met:
"First, Congress must provide unambiguously that the State will be
subject to suit if it engages in certain specified conduct governed by
federal regulation. Second, the State must voluntarily elect to engage in
the federally regulated conduct that subjects it to suit.

'229

Based on the

Supreme Court's holding in Dole and its progeny, Congress has
authority, under its spending power, to condition the receipt of federal
funding on a state's waiver of its Eleventh Amendment immunity.
The proposed Senate bill meets the first requirement under the Dole
23
0
test. The conditioning of funds will ensure state employees their rights
under the ADEA and other similar employment acts. "In the absence of
the deterrent effect that such remedies provide, there is a greater
likelihood that entities carrying out programs and activities receiving
of Dole, pre-College Savings Eleventh Amendment cases suggest that a state can waive
its immunity by participating in a federal spending program that explicitly conditions
receipt of funds on such a waiver.
Hamrick, supra note 34, at 888.
225. Dole, 483 U.S. at 206.
226. Litman v. George Mason Univ., 186 F.3d 544, 551 (4th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S.
1181 (2000) (quoting Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981)). The
Litman court stated that
in exercising its spending power, the federal government "condition[s] an offer of federal
funding on the promise by the recipient not to discriminate, in what amounts essentially
to a contract between the Government and the recipient of funds.". .. And it also
conditions these funds on the recipient state's consent to be sued in federal court for an
alleged breach of the promise not to discriminate.
Id. at 551-52 (alteration in original) (citations omitted).
227. Id. at 552.
228. 527 U.S. 666 (1999).
229. Id. at 679. The Court held that Congress cannot use its spending power to force a state's
compliance by withholding funds from instrumental and necessary state functions. See id. at 679-80.
230. See supra text accompanying note 222.
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Federal financial assistance will use that assistance to violate that Act, or
that the assistance will otherwise subsidize or facilitate violations of that
Act., 23' Congress's use of the Dole doctrine will provide consistency in
the law and eliminate a state's procedural advantage over an employee
in federal court. The purpose of the ADEA was to end age
discrimination; as President Nixon noted
"[age discrimination] can be as great an evil in our society as
discrimination based on race or religion or any other characteristic
which ignores a person's unique status as an individual and treats him
or her as a member of some arbitrarily-defined group. Especially in the
employment field, discrimination based on age is cruel and selfdefeating; it destroys the spirit of those who want to work and it denies
the National [sic] the contribution they could make if they were
working.

232

The second requirement of the Dole test 233 is met because Congress
clearly states that failure to comply with the proposed bill to amend the
ADEA will result in denial of federal funding. Congress's proposed
legislation meets the third Dole requirement 234 because the ADEA
ensures that older Americans will not be terminated solely on the basis
of their age,233 thus lowering the number of older employees that may be
dependent on scarce governmental resources. The national interest is
also served by promoting the use of our best available labor resources.
Because the proposed legislation has no constitutional bar, the fourth
requirement of the Dole test 236 is met.
VI. CONCLUSION
Substantial changes to current federal labor and employment laws
are necessary to protect a state employee asserting her federal
employment rights. In the interest of justice, a state must forfeit its
immunity to ensure that the state employee receives protection equal to
that afforded to a federal, private, or local employee. To nullify the
231. S.928, 107th Cong. § 2(4) (2001), available at http://thomas.loc.gov.
232. HOUSE GEN. SUBCOMM. ON LABOR, H. REP. No. 93-913 (1974), reprinted in 1974
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2811, 2849 (citation omitted).
233. See supra text accompanying note 223.
234. See supra text accompanying note 224.
235. Ramirez v. P.R. Fire Serv., 715 F.2d 694, 699 (1st Cir. 1983) (holding that "legislative
history... makes it plain that Congress' purpose in extending ADEA coverage was to shield public
employees from the invidious effects of age-based discrimination").
236. See supra text accompanying note 225.
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procedural advantage enjoyed by states under the Eleventh Amendment,
courts must treat removal to federal court as a waiver of immunity.
Under this approach, a state would be required to raise an Eleventh
Amendment immunity defense at its first appearance in federal court;
that is, before the state argues the case on the merits. Therefore, removal
would be an express and unequivocal waiver of sovereign immunity.
The proposed Congressional amendment of the ADEA and other
labor and employment laws would enable a state employee to assert her
rights under these laws. In amending these statutes to condition the
receipt of federal funding on a state's waiver of its sovereign immunity,
a state employee would receive adequate compensation should the state
violate her federal employment rights. Such action is necessary to
protect the rights of workers in all employment settings from
discrimination on the basis of age and disability.
Sabina Sosunova and Bonnie A. Tucker*
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